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The effect of corruption and culture on mandatory disclosure compliance levels: 
goodwill reporting in Europe. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
While responding to calls for research and regulatory concerns regarding the influence of 
country level characteristics on the completeness and quality of financial statements, we 
examine the simultaneous influences of corruption and culture on levels of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure requirements. We use a panel dataset of European companies, for 2008 
to 2011, and measure compliance with IFRS goodwill disclosure requirements utilising a 
disclosure index. Corruption is measured using the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and 
Schwartz (2008) bipolar cultural dimensions are used as measures of culture. We find that 
compliance levels vary significantly across sample firms, countries and over time. The level 
of corruption and two of the three cultural dimensions (Hierarchy and Mastery) are 
significantly related to these levels of compliance. These findings also hold for the changes in 
compliance levels over time. On that basis, the paper makes original contributions to our 
understanding of determinants of compliance levels with IFRS mandatory disclosure 
requirements.  
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1. Introduction 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) provide a framework for mandatory 
accounting disclosures by companies. Such a framework is designed to facilitate an increase 
in information transparency and reduce economic value uncertainty (Barth and Schipper, 
2007; Hope, 2003; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). Deriving from this, Abdullah et al. (2015, p. 
330) assert that “unlike voluntary disclosures, mandatory disclosures compel companies to 
make public both proprietary and non-proprietary information (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008) and 
both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news (Verrecchia, 2001)”. Motivated by similar arguments, Mobus 
(2005) argues that mandatory accounting disclosures are a potential tool of public policy. 
However, managers assess the cost/benefit arising from the ‘regulatory risk’ (c.f., Adams, 
1994; Mayorga, 2013) of omission and non-compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements 
and effectively make disclosure choices. As Giner and Pardo (2015, p. 22) observe, levels of 
compliance are subject to “managerial discretion versus transparency of providing 
information about the underlying economics of the firm”. 
Indeed, there is evidence in the practice-based and academic literatures that companies 
rarely fully comply with IFRS accounting disclosure requirements, even in developed 
countries/markets (e.g., ESMA, 2013; Glaum et al., 2013; Tsalavoutas et al., 2014). There is 
also evidence of non-compliance in non-IFRS reporters in developed markets. For example, 
Ayers et al. (2015, p. 61) reported: “some of the largest and most sophisticated firms in the 
US capital markets do not comply with mandatory disclosure requirements”. Such findings 
are in contrast with the “implicit assumption in most [accounting] studies that preparers’ level 
of compliance [and mandatory disclosure] is even across all reporting jurisdictions” 
(Amiraslani et al., 2013, p. 18). The importance of compliance is explicitly recognised with 
Hodgdon et al. (2008, p. 1) asserting that “the extent of compliance with accounting standards 
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is as important as the standards themselves”. Thus, examining levels of compliance with 
IFRS’ requirements and, more specifically, the underlying determining factors is pertinent.  
In this study, we examine corruption and culture as two country-level influences of levels 
of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements in relation to goodwill (as 
required by IFRS 3 Business Combinations and IAS 36 Impairment of assets). Our motivation 
is as follows. Jaggi and Low (2000, p. 517) stated that “future studies could develop a 
disclosure index, which is directly based on financial disclosures contained in the firms’ 
financial statements ... and to provide a better insight into the association between cultural 
values and financial disclosures” (emphasis added). Likewise, Hope (2003) argues that it is 
“premature to write off culture as an important factor in the financial reporting environment” 
(p. 218). Further, in his conclusion, he stressed the need for studies to investigate “whether 
variations in culture are associated with specific accounting choices” and that “such 
disclosure studies can be informative for researchers and standard setters alike” (ibid: p. 242). 
However, whilst there have been these explicit calls for research in relation to culture and 
compliance with mandatory disclosures, Akman (2011, p. 6) laments that “the effect of 
cultural dimensions on financial disclosure has not been studied after the widespread use of 
International Financial Reporting Standards”.  
In relation to corruption, Malagueño et al. (2010) noted the relative lack of cross-country 
empirical research between accounting and corruption (and similarly see Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2004; DiRienzo et al, 2007). More recently, Houqe and Monem (2016, p. 364) confirmed that 
despite the increased attention to corruption in the management and international business 
literatures “research literature linking corruption with accounting is sparse”. Similarly, 
Lourenço et al., (2017, p. 4) highlight that “accounting researchers have left the relation 
between accounting and corruption almost untouched”. This lack of research in the area is 
important given that Brown et al. (2014), who studied the effect of enforcement bodies and 
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auditing with regard to financial reporting transparency in Europe, recognise that culture and 
legal setting (including corruption, see La Porta et al, 1998) will affect the output of financial 
reporting.  
Thus, corruption levels and cultural traits in a country may play a significant role in 
helping to explain non-compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements. Further, recent 
studies that report country level enforcement is a key determinant of compliance, either ignore 
corruption and culture (Tsalavoutas et al., 2014) or only very narrowly examine such 
influences, as determinants of compliance levels (e.g., Glaum et al, 2013 uses only one aspect 
of culture and ignores corruption). Finally, prior studies on the determinants of compliance 
with mandatory disclosures tend to be either country case studies and/or focus on a single year 
immediately following the widespread adoption of IFRS in 2005 (e.g., Glaum et al., 2013; 
Tsalavoutas, 2011; Verriest et al., 2013). 
Goodwill is specifically examined as both the academic and practice-based literatures 
highlight its economic importance (EFRAG, 2016; Tsalavoutas et al., 2014), complexity and 
the use of managerial assumptions around its impairment testing (ESMA, 2015; Giner and 
Pardo, 2015; Mazzi et al., 2016; Petersen and Plenborg, 2010) and its continued presence on 
IASB agendas (EFRAG, 2016). Within Europe, the topic has attracted considerable attention 
from ESMA (2013; 2015). Based on a sample of 16 European countries, we employ 779 firm-
year observations, constituents of the Standard and Poor’s Europe 350 (S&P EU350) index, 
for the period 2008-2011. This allows for the possibility of non-compliance in the early years 
of transition to IFRS being influenced by non-familiarity with the standards’ requirements 
(c.f., Kvaal and Nobes, 2012). We use a checklist for goodwill related disclosure required by 
IFRS 3 and IAS 36 and manually collected data for scoring our sample firms’ levels of 
compliance. Our checklist approach (after controlling for materiality and relevance) is able to 
capture the extent of omission of mandatory disclosures and thus a lack of compliance with 
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accounting standards. Corruption is measured according to the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) calculated by Transparency International. We measure cultural values using Schwartz’s 
(2008) cultural dimensions, since prior studies suggest that these capture more aspects of 
culture than Hofstede’s cultural values (Ng et al., 2007; Steenkamp, 2001). As Schwartz’s 
cultural dimensions are created loosely as seven dimensions comprising three pairs of 
opposite values, we test one cultural dimension from each pair: hierarchy, mastery and 
embeddedness.   
Our findings show that corruption, hierarchy and mastery are significantly related to 
goodwill disclosure compliance levels, while Embeddedness seems not to play a role in 
explaining compliance when corruption is simultaneously considered. Additionally, we 
demonstrate that the changes in compliance over time are also related to the levels of 
corruption, hierarchy and mastery in a country. Thus, we contribute to the mandatory 
disclosure literature by revealing that corruption and culture are key determinants of 
compliance levels and their change over time. Additionally, we extend the knowledge from 
Glaum et al. (2013) and Tsalavoutas et al. (2014) in that strong enforcement mechanisms 
alone are not a sufficient condition for financial reporting compliance and transparency at a 
country level (c.f, Brown et al., 2014). These results are robust to several sensitivity tests, 
including different model specification and alternative measures for corruption and culture 
and controlling for other types of quality of corporate reporting. As we discuss in our 
conclusions, these findings raise wider policy implications pertinent to investors, wider users 
of financial statements, regulators and standard setters concerned with non-compliance and 
the transparency of financial reporting (Abdullah et al., 2015; IASB, 2013; Schipper, 2007) at 
a country level.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2, initially considers the 
importance goodwill and then provides coverage of the literature with regard to corruption, 
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culture and accounting and associated hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the 
approach adopted in measuring our key variables, the methods employed, and sample 
selection process. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical findings. Section 5 illustrates 
additional tests and Section 6 concludes the paper by outlining the contributions arising from 
this research. It also discusses limitations and avenues for further research. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Importance of goodwill related disclosures  
In order to examine the potential effect of corruption and cultural traits on the extent of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements across countries, the research sought to 
identify an accounting area/topic which would be deemed as important and of particular 
interest for companies’ managers but also investors and regulators. With this in mind, we 
focus specifically on goodwill related disclosures as required by IFRS 3 and IAS 36.  
Firstly, goodwill is a material component of companies’ total assets (Tsalavoutas et al., 
2014). For example, in 2011, goodwill represented an average 34% of net assets and 26% of 
market capitalisation across the 328 largest firms in the EU (EFRAG, 2016). Goodwill’s total 
value across these firms was 1.33 trillion Euros in that year. Hence, goodwill is of 
significance due to its information content in relation to the economic value of an enterprise 
(Al-Jifri and Citron, 2009; Barth and Clinch, 1996), while providing insights into proprietary 
information (Li et al., 2011).  
Secondly, Mazzi et al. (2016) who survey CFOs of Italian listed firms and Petersen and 
Plenborg (2010) who survey Danish listed companies report complimentary evidence that 
preparers view IAS 36 as a complex standard. For instance, it demands specific knowledge of 
valuation techniques that inevitably involve substantial judgement and is atypical amongst 
IFRS’s. Following on from this, the estimation of goodwill recoverable amount relies on 
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management assumptions and estimations that enable financial statement users to gather 
information about a firm’s private information (Dye, 1985). The latter is evidenced through 
those disclosures that relate to goodwill impairment (Bens et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011) that 
convey future economic information and managerial judgement concerning a predicted fall in 
future earnings and hence the carrying value of goodwill. Giner and Pardo (2015) highlighted 
non-compliance and managerial discretion with regard to accounting for goodwill in Spain. 
They demonstrated that impairments around goodwill are managed with discretion and, as a 
consequence, compliance with the disclosures around goodwill could be similarly managed. 
Finally, arising from these complexities and in-part concerns over compliance, goodwill 
accounting is an ongoing research agenda item for IASB, for instance the goodwill and 
impairment project and continuing review following the post implementation review of IFRS 
3 (IASB, 2015). Prior to this, the German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) in 
their compliance review identified goodwill and impairment testing as one of their major 
areas of concern in respect of German listed companies (FREP, 2011). Hence, Giner and 
Pardo (2015, p. 36) note that goodwill remains “the subject of intense debate in academia, and 
in the professional and regulatory worlds”.  
 
2.2 Corruption, accounting disclosure and compliance 
Prior empirical research has, almost universally, found that corruption has an adverse impact 
on business activity due to a lack of transparency and the misallocation and inefficient use of 
resources (e.g., Bryant and Javalgi, 2015; Voyer and Beamish, 2004). Corruption is 
commonly defined as the “abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency 
International, 2009, p. 7). Drawing on the management literature, in environments where 
corruption is strong, corruption is collectively ‘normalized’ (Ashforth and Anand, 2003) and 
is associated with a gradual erosion of moral agency over time (Ashforth et al., 2008; Brief et 
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al., 2001; Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2008). Thus, as put forward by Ashforth and Anand 
(2003, p. 8), “once a corrupt decision or act produces a positive outcome and is included in 
organizational memory, it is likely to be used again in the future” and this is not perceived as 
unacceptable. Hence, in such environments, based on the rational expectation of a profit-
maximising agent (Kimbro, 2002), some managers may use this non-market mechanism to 
improve their own well-being through exercising undue discretion (Hamir, 1999) with regard 
to a lack of compliance. 
In an accounting context, the adverse effect of corruption is mostly highlighted by 
research on earnings opacity1 and earnings management (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2002; 
Kimbro 2002; Picur, 2004; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Riahi-Belkaoui and AlNajjar, 2006). For 
instance, Picur, (2004, p. 104) who examined a sample of 34 countries concluded that, 
“earning opacity, as a measure of the low quality of accounting, [is] predisposed to a climate 
of corruption”. Hence, the accountability and transparency of accounting information is 
diminished. Similarly, Riahi-Belkaoui, (2004, p. 82), using a cross-country longitudinal 
dataset covering the period 1985 to 1998 observed that “corruption creates a climate 
conducive to a low quality accounting” and finds that earnings opacity is positively related to 
the presence of corruption in a given country. Furthermore, Fan et al. (2014) highlight the link 
of accounting opacity and corruption in China, whereby managers distort accounting 
information to cover their expropriation of interests from common investors. Recently, 
Lourenço et al., (2017) who utilise data from 33 countries worldwide find that country 
perceived corruption is related to higher incentives for firms to manipulate earnings in the 
case of emerging countries. They contend that “a wide diversity of behaviours may be 
encompassed within the notion of earnings management, ranging from those which comply 
                                                 
1 Earnings opacity, like earnings management, can be defined as the alteration or design of firms' reported 
economic performance by insiders to either “mislead some stakeholders” or to “influence contractual outcomes” 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
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with the accounting standards in place to those that violate said standards” (ibid, p. 3). Such 
earnings manipulation is broadly reflective of managerial judgements in the financial 
reporting process (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000). 
The findings on corruption and earnings opacity/management are in line with the 
commonly held view that corruption is widespread in countries with a lack of transparency 
which fosters information asymmetry (Kimbro, 2002; DiRienzo et al., 2007; Malagueño et al., 
2010). Indeed, whilst there has been very limited direct research on corruption and accounting 
disclosure (as noted by Houqe and Monem, 2016), nonetheless, prior research has generally 
shown a negative relationship between levels of corruption and levels of information 
transparency in general (DiRienzo et al., 2007; Everett et al., 2007; Halter et al., 2009). 
Specifically, DiRienzo et al (2007) using cluster analysis across a set of 85 countries affirm 
that “highly corrupt countries may restrict the free flow of information” (p. 329). This tension 
between corruption and transparency was highlighted by Houqe and Monem (2016 p. 363) 
who find that the “extent of disclosure [is] negatively related to perceived corruption in a 
country”.2 Prior research has also shown that companies in countries with high levels of 
corruption tend to have lower levels of corporate social performance disclosures (Baldini et 
al., 2016; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). On voluntary disclosure specifically, in a two country 
African study, Agyei-Mensah, (2017a) examined the impact of corruption on the levels of 
forward-looking disclosures in the period 2011 to 2013. The study found a negative 
association between such disclosures in a highly corrupt environment (Ghana) compared to a 
low corrupt environment (Botswana). The research thus indicated the relationship between the 
level of corruption and the “transparency level of listed firms” (p. 284).  
Following this line of argument, and pertinent to this research, Houqe and Monem (2016 
p. 366) argue that “corruption is about secrecy (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993), then it follows that 
                                                 
2 It is noted that the disclosure captured in their research is based on a World Bank country disclosure index, 
including both mandatory and voluntary items, as a year on year change between 0 to 10. 
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greater disclosure of sensitive transactions would be associated with lower perceived 
corruption”. Further, Riahi-Belkaoui and AlNajjar, (2006, p. 189) observe that “it is the social 
and economic climate (which includes corruption) rather than the technical accounting 
climate that is at the core of the lack of accounting quality in general”. Indeed, in a subsequent 
study on Ghana and Botswana, Agyei-Mensah, (2017b) significantly found that levels of 
compliance in relation to IFRS 7 were related to levels of high (Ghana) and low (Botswana) 
levels of corruption. Thus, he asserted that “corruption enables poor disclosure and 
compliance with IFRS 7 requirements. One way of hiding corrupt practices is for companies 
to disclose scanty information” (ibid, p. 1)3 (c.f. Giner and Pardo, 2015; Hamir, 1999).  
In the context of our study, mandatory goodwill disclosures are designed to help convey 
future economic information concerning future earnings and hence value. As such, goodwill 
disclosures, and specifically those involving impairment, would be regarded as ‘sensitive’ 
following the assertion of Houqe and Monem (2016) (and also see discussion in 2.1 above). 
Thus, in a society with higher levels of corruption it follows that there will be a lower level of 
compliance with goodwill related mandatory disclosure requirements. Hence, we test the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: Levels of compliance with mandatory goodwill disclosures are negatively associated 
with the level of corruption in a country. 
 
2.3 Culture, accounting disclosure and compliance 
It is well recognised that companies’ accounting practices are associated with the cultural 
context within which they operate. For example earnings management (Han et al., 2010; 
Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai, 2007), tax evasion (Tsakumis et al., 2007), carbon disclosure 
propensity (Luo et al., 2016) and corporate governance practices (Duong et al., 2016; Griffin 
                                                 
3 We note that the research is limited by its scope and also from relatively small sample size (30 and 28 
companies for Ghana and Botswana respectively). 
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et al., 2017) have been linked to differing national cultures. Additionally, at a conceptual 
level, Jaggi (1975) argued that the cultural environments of a country would have a strong 
influence on financial disclosures by firms in that country. Reflecting on this, Gray (1988) 
modelling for the cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede (1980) found that financial 
disclosures in different countries are influenced by underlying cultural traits, shaping 
managers’ internal and external financial reporting choices. Further, Salter and Niswander 
(1995, p. 394) asserted that Gray’s model helps to “explain cross-national differences in 
accounting structure and practice, which is particularly strong in explaining differential 
financial reporting practices”.  
Empirically, however, there is mixed evidence regarding culture and accounting 
disclosure. Whilst Zarzeski (1996) found that the impact of cultural values on corporate 
disclosures by international firms is insignificant, this was based on a combination of 
voluntary disclosures and basic mandatory requirements such as the existence of a balance 
sheet and comparative figures. Jaggi and Low (2000) used the International Financial 
Reporting Index (IFRI) for Industrial Companies scores which captures actual disclosures and 
not disclosures required by accounting standards. Based on this, they conclude that “cultural 
values have an insignificant impact on financial disclosures by firms from common law 
countries, and the results on firms from code law countries provide mixed signals” (p. 495). In 
contrast, Archambault and Archambault (2003) found that accounting disclosure is strongly 
influenced by culture, concluding that disclosure is a function of national-level factors. Hope 
(2003), drawing on Hofstede (1980) and Schwartz (1994), likewise found that firm level 
annual report disclosure (which includes voluntary reporting), based on scores calculated by 
the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR), is significantly related 
to national culture. Thus, Hope (2003, p. 221) concluded that it makes “intuitive sense that the 
environment in which the firm operates affects financial reporting and disclosures. […] One 
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such element of the environment is culture”. Orij (2010) using a single year, cross-country, 
study highlighted the significance of culture in relation to voluntary social disclosure. Finally, 
Schultz and Lόpez (2001: 276) report that “cultural differences play a special role in defining 
the differences in the … individual judgments related to accounting measurements and 
disclosures”. Whilst the above largely historic studies provide some initial insights, they fail 
to fully capture the dimension of compliance with IFRS mandated disclosures, post 2005 in 
particular. Instead, their findings are based on only voluntary disclosures and at best a mix of 
voluntary and mandatory disclosures. To the best of our knowledge, it is only the single-year 
(2005) study by Glaum et al. (2013) that has considered only a single element of culture – 
while ignoring the potential concurrent effect of Corruption, and compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosure. They report that their measure of conservatism is negatively associated 
with disclosure compliance. Thus, by specifically examining the role of culture and corruption 
simultaneously on compliance with mandated disclosures under IFRS for the period 2008-
2011, this research adds evidence regarding the potential influence of the dimensions of 
culture on non-compliant behaviour and responds directly to calls of prior literature for such 
an examination (see Akman, 2011; Jaggi and Low, 2000; Husted, 1999; Hope, 2003.)   
One of the challenges faced in the literature in dealing with culture is the specification of 
cultural variables to be used in the research. For instance, Sekely and Collins (1998, p. 89) 
note that “cultural factors cover a wide spectrum and include the whole set of social 
norms...which make one social environment different from another and give each a shape of 
its own”. To address this issue, many prior studies have adopted Hofstede’s four cultural 
dimensions: individualism-collectivism; uncertainty avoidance; masculinity-femininity, and, 
power-distance (e.g., Gleason et al., 2000; Han et al., 2010; Tsakumis et al., 2007). However, 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions have been subject to criticism, especially with regard to being 
outdated (see Baskerville, 2003; Jaggi and Low 2000; McSweeney, 2002). Additionally, 
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Hofstede relied on IBM employees which has been criticised on the basis that not all 
employees share a similar work culture. Additionally, within-country differences are ignored 
(Heidhues and Patel, 2011).  
Recognising these criticisms, other research has previously drawn on Schwartz, for 
instance Chui et al. (2002) and Ding et al. (2005), both of whom used Schwartz (1994). 
Schwartz’s approach to culture differs from prior cultural conceptualisations (Hofstede, 2001; 
Inglehart and Barker, 2000) as it adopted an a priori theorisation followed by empirical 
testing. The resulting cultural dimensions were based upon large scale country-level survey 
data with respondents from 38 countries rating the importance of 56 cultural value items as 
guiding principles in their own lives. Fairbairn (2014, p. 41) commented thus: “Hofstede’s 
dimensions are conceptualised as individual level dimensions (Schwartz, 2006) [being] 
disjointed or disconnected whereas Schwartz’s cultural dimensions provide a more 
encompassing view of culture”. Interested readers could see Ng et al. (2007) and Fairbairn 
(2014) for a fuller discussion of Schwartz and the development of cultural dimensions. 
More recently, and in a specific accounting context, Glaum et al. (2013) drew upon 
Schwartz’s updated measures (i.e., Schwartz, 2008) who conceptualised culture as seven 
cultural value orientations comprised of three bi-polar dimensions, Hierarchy vs. 
Egalitarianism; Mastery vs. Harmony; Embeddedness vs. Autonomy as shown in Figure 1. 
We also use this framework to develop our hypotheses. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Specifically, for each pair, one of the dimensions is selected for developing our 
hypotheses, given their inverse bipolar relationship, for testing the relation of cultural values 
and levels of compliance. Further, we draw on psychology and agency theory literatures (c.f., 
Chui et al., 2002; Haigh, 2006). The psychology based literature highlights the ‘locus of 
control’ as a means through which individuals through their own actions and decisions 
13 
 
influence outcomes (Duffy et al., 1977). Grounded on this, agency theory recognises 
managers’ opportunistic motivations and aspirations for the pursuit of personal goals and tries 
to explain managers’ behaviours with regard to accounting choices (Haigh, 2006).  
First, with respect to Hierarchy, this dimension includes the values of wealth, social power 
and authority. This dimension has a high score when the distribution of power and resources 
in society is unequal, with those at the top of the hierarchy having considerable influence and 
social power which is respected and not challenged by others in society. The latter is reflected 
in the inclusion of the value humble in this dimension. The hierarchical pyramid structure 
contrasts to egalitarianism that represents a more equal sharing of power in society. 
Jaggi and Low (2000) and Hope (2003) both suggest that differences in disclosure levels 
can be explained by the level of secrecy within a culture associated with a hierarchical 
culture. They add that this could be particularly true of disclosures relating to expected future 
performance of specific segments of the firm. In our case, this is also particularly relevant 
given that some goodwill impairment disclosures have to be reported across segments. In our 
context, in a hierarchical society, managers within a firm would view themselves as being at 
the top of the hierarchy compared to shareholders and other stakeholders. This suggests that 
the distance between managers as agents and stakeholders as principals is amplified, giving 
rise to higher agency costs. Managers in countries with high Hierarchy values, would 
maintain as much control over their firm as possible, thus preserving firm specific and 
proprietary information, the latter being a key feature of goodwill related disclosure. Based on 
the above discussion we test the following hypothesis: 
H2: Levels of compliance with mandatory goodwill disclosures are negatively associated with 
the level of Hierarchy in a country. 
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Second, within societies with high levels of Mastery the values of being capable, influential, 
ambitious, successful and choosing one's own goals prevail. Effectively, self-assertion and the 
desire to get ahead of others accentuate active mastery (Chui et al., 2002) in pursuit of 
individual goals thereby enhancing reputation and reducing personal levels of career risk.  
Based upon this, one could foresee the agency issue associated with asymmetric 
information and career concerns as motivating managers to withhold or delay bad news 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012; Kothari et al., 2009; Verrecchia, 2001) with consequent 
lower levels of compliance. Indeed, Kothari et al. (2009), present evidence from management 
forecasts, albeit based on voluntary information, that, on average, managers delay the release 
of bad news relative to good news.  
In contrast to this, there are arguments suggesting that the values within Mastery would 
motive managers to demonstrate a more compliant behavior hence resulting in higher levels 
of company disclosure compliance. First, consistent with the ‘regulatory risk’ argument 
advanced by Abdullah et al. (2015), the litigation cost hypothesis (c.f., Skinner, 1994; 1997) 
asserts that, in a capital markets setting, managers may incur reputational costs if they do not 
disclose bad news in a timely manner (and see Baginski et al., 2002; Karpoff, 2008; 
Marinovic and Varas, 2016). In support of this, Mayorga (2013, p. 1150), based on interviews 
with managers responsible for companies’ mandatory disclosures, reports that their disclosure 
decisions are positively influenced inter alia by ‘perceived regulatory and litigation risks’. 
Managers may also face personal litigation due to a delay in any disclosure or from a lack of 
compliance (Brown et al., 2014; Johnson et al., 2001; Lev, 1995).  
Second, and consistent with management talent signalling hypothesis (Trueman, 1986), 
prior literature indicates that high levels of mandatory disclosure provided by companies are 
associated with lower cost of equity capital (Paugum and Ramond, 2015) and higher market 
values (André et al., 2017; Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou, 2014), hence, resulting in a tangible 
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benefit for the shareholders. In support of this, prior research contends that institutional 
investors and financial analysts demand greater transparency and penalise firms that have a 
reputation of withholding bad news by choosing not to hold or follow their stocks (Ajinkya et 
al., 2005). Thus, in our context, in a society with high levels of Mastery, managers, through 
disclosure, would signal their credibility to shareholders and also reducing litigation and 
reputational risks, thus portraying compliant behaviour. This would be particularly relevant as 
it would be perceived to help them become more successful in their competitive environment 
(Jaggi and Low, 2000). Based on this, we test the following hypothesis: 
H3: Levels of compliance with mandatory goodwill disclosures are positively associated with 
the level of Mastery in a country. 
 
Finally, the third dimension, Embeddedness is characterised inter alia by the value items of 
respecting tradition, social order, obedience, politeness, preserving public image, and self-
discipline. Countries with high Embeddedness scores value close knit, harmonious 
relationships within their communities. Embeddedness strengthens societal relations by 
removing boundaries between the person and the group in society. The individual’s personal 
objectives coincide with the objectives of the group. Managers in these countries, through 
obedience to accounting standards, are thus more likely to act in alignment with the interest of 
shareholders. Thus, in such countries, one would expect high levels of compliance, 
demonstrative of an environment in which agency costs are minimised (Chui et al., 2002, with 
reference to Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This would suggest that managers would comply 
with the accounting standards by providing the required disclosures to preserve the 
relationship they have with their shareholders and other stakeholders. Based on this, we test 
the following hypothesis: 
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H4: Levels of compliance with mandatory goodwill disclosures are positively associated with 
the level of Embeddedness in a country. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Sample selection process 
We use a final panel of 779 firm-year observations, relating to 222 firms, based on the non-
financial companies included in the S&P EU350 for the period 2008 to 2011. This period 
marks the immediate reporting periods after the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, prior to 
which there had been a surge in mergers and acquisitions (Ernst and Young, 2009; Giner and 
Pardo, 2015) with, significantly, goodwill accounting for nearly 50% of the value of acquired 
companies. The sample selection process, detailing the criteria on which firms are selected, is 
reported in Panel A of Table 1. In line with prior literature (e.g., Al-Akra et al., 2010), we 
excluded financial companies. Beyond firm selection, 109 firm-year observations are 
additionally dropped because they either have a negative book value of equity in any given 
year or their value of goodwill is immaterial. Goodwill is deemed material if it is greater than 
5% of book value of equity (ESMA, 2011) and only firms with such levels of goodwill are 
maintained in the sample.4 Panel B disaggregates our sample observations across countries 
and industries. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
4 The sample thus reflects the composition of the S&P EU350 index with some countries, such as the UK and 
France having a high number of companies participating, in comparison to others with very low representation 
(e.g., Greece and Ireland). This distribution is similar to that of prior research using large listed companies in 
Europe (e.g., Glaum et al., 2013; Kvaal and Nobes, 2012; Verriest et al., 2013). However, arguably, our results 
could be biased because of this uneven representation. To detect any such sensitivity, we replicate our analyses 
in the following way. First, we exclude the countries with the fewest observations (i.e., Greece and Ireland). 
Second, we also exclude Austria which has exactly ten observations. In both cases, the results illustrate that the 
analyses presented in the paper below and the deriving conclusions do not change.  
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3.2 Measurement of compliance with goodwill disclosure levels 
We use the disclosure checklists developed and validated by Mazzi et al. (2017) to score the 
compliance levels for each firm.5 These checklists contain items relevant to goodwill 
disclosures as required by IAS 36 and IFRS 3. Given that goodwill is material for all our 
sample firms, all items in these lists are applicable unless they relate to non-material 
impairment losses and non-material business combinations. Thus, we also applied criteria for 
ensuring that specific items related to material goodwill impairment losses (equal or more 
than 5% of goodwill, as at the start of year), individually material business combinations, and 
individually immaterial but material collectively business combinations (purchase price 
accounts equal or more than 5% of the company’s total assets or sales) are applicable (Mazzi 
et al., 2017). The process of calculating disclosure levels for all sample firms is as follows. If 
a required item is disclosed, it is scored as 1 and if not, it is scored as 0. In case an item is not 
applicable to a company, it is scored as ‘not applicable’ (NA) (Cooke, 1992).  
To ensure the reliability of the coding against the checklist, the whole annual report, 
including the notes to the financial statements, was read and coded by two of the authors 
independently. As a further check, the pdf version was also searched during the coding 
process using relevant keywords: IAS 36, IFRS 3, business combination, impairment, 
goodwill, acquisition, negative goodwill, and bargain purchase. The authors then compared 
results to resolve any differences for the final agreed sample. This process enabled us to 
identify all relevant disclosures and, importantly, those instances where companies do not 
provide information about material items and thus do not comply with the standards’ 
requirements. 
A disclosure index for each company is then calculated as the ratio of the total items 
disclosed to the number of items applicable:  
                                                 
5 We thank Mazzi et al. (2017) for providing us with their checklists for the purposes of our study. 
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(1) 
where  is the total compliance score for each company and 0≤Discj≤1.  is the total 
number of items disclosed (di) by company  and  is the maximum number of applicable 
disclosure items for company j (e.g., Glaum et al., 2013; Hodgdon et al., 2008; Tsalavoutas, 
2011).   
As it is highly probable that the actual compliance score may not be normally distributed 
(Cooke, 1998), in our multivariate analysis, we also employ an alternative disclosure measure: 
we transform disclosure scores in a percentile rank (DiscRank) (e.g., Glaum et al., 2013; 
Nikolaev and Van Lent, 2005; Tsalavoutas, 2011). DiscRank is less sensitive to outliers 
(Cooke, 1998), it has a normal distribution (McCabe, 1989) and corrects for kurtosis and 
skewness (Tsalavoutas, 2011). We first employ dense ranking (to overcome the possibility 
that different companies may have the same level of disclosure scores (ties)) and then 
calculate DiscRank: 
 
(2) 
where DiscRankj,t is the percentile rank of firm j during year t, Rankj,t is j’s rank/position and 
MaxDenset is the sample size less the number of ties for year t. DiscRankt varies between 0 
and 1, with 1 indicating the highest level of compliance. Firms are ranked in ascending order, 
so that DiscRank increases with disclosure levels.6  
 
                                                 
6 It is noted that both the actual score and DiscRank result in the dependent variable being bounded between 0 
and 1. Thus, it is possible that the OLS regression parameters may suggest expected compliance greater than 1 
(Cooke, 1998). To account for this, we have also performed a Tobit regression as a sensitivity test. Untabulated 
results are almost identical to those under the OLS regression presented in the paper.   
19 
 
3.3 Empirical models 
Prior empirical literature has shown that financial reporting quality is determined by a number 
of factors. These include “incentives faced by management, enforcement and capital-market 
supervision” (Tsalavoutas et al., 2014: 44; with reference to Ball et al. 2003; Hope 2003; Leuz 
et al. 2003; Bushman et al. 2004; Francis et al. 2005; Francis and Wang 2008). In line with 
this, it is commonly argued and empirically shown that compliance with mandated disclosure 
is a function of both company-level and country-level determinants (Al-Shammari et al., 
2008; Glaum et al., 2013; Tsalavoutas et al., 2014).  
We examine the association between compliance with goodwill related disclosure 
requirements, the level of corruption and cultural traits in a country by estimating the 
following OLS regression model: 
Disclosure = b0 + b1CPI + b2Hierarchy + b3Mastery + b4Embeddedness + b5GdwBV 
+ b6MaterialIL+ b7MaterialBC  + b8MrktMet + b9Size + 
b10Leverage + b11Liquidity + b12ROA + b13StrategicOwn + 
b14Audit + b15Enforcement + b16AbsDisc + Industry fixed effects 
+ Year fixed effects + ɛ 
(3) 
where: 
Disclosure  = Disc and DiscRank as defined in Section 3.2 
CPI   = Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International 
Hierarchy  = country cultural dimension provided by Schwartz (2008) 
Mastery  = country cultural dimension provided by Schwartz (2008) 
Embeddedness = country cultural dimension provided by Schwartz (2008) 
GdwBV  = percentage of goodwill on book value of equity 
MaterialIL = dummy variable indicating whether a firm experienced a material 
impairment loss  
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MaterialBC  = dummy variable indicating whether a firm experienced a material  
business combination 
MrktMet  = dummy variable indicating whether a firm met the market  
expectation7 with regard to recognition of goodwill impairment loss  
Size   = natural logarithm of market value at beginning of year 
Leverage  = total debt divided by book value of equity 
Liquidity  = current assets divided by current liabilities 
ROA   = net income divided by total assets 
StrategicOwn  = the aggregate % of ownership held by institutional investors and 
pension funds who hold more than 5% of companies’ shares8  
Audit   = quality of the public company auditors’ working environment  
   measured in 2008 as provided by Brown et al. (2014) 
Enforcement   = degree of accounting enforcement activity measured in 2008 as 
provided by Brown et al. (2014)  
AbsDisc  = differences between countries national GAAPs and IFRSs as 
provided by Ding et al. (2007) 
We report all the variables employed in our models together with their sources in the 
Appendix. The control variables we include in our analysis have been identified in the prior 
                                                 
7 According to Ramanna and Watts (2012), if book-to-market<1 in year t-2 and book-to-market>1 in year t-1 and 
t, then the market expects an impairment loss. 
8 We acknowledge that this variable may not capture institutional/pension fund ownership of 3%-4% which 
might be common in large firms. As a result, arguably, StrategicOwn may not to be the best proxy for 
large/concentrated ownership. On that basis, we proceed by downloading additional data from the database 
ASSET4 from Thomson Reuters and we capture the % ownership of the single biggest owner (by voting power) 
(CGSRDP045). The Pearson correlation between size and this variable is positive and significant (0.084, 
p<0.05), as would be expected. We also replicate our tests by substituting our StrategicOwn metric and this new 
variable. The results of these tests indicate a significant and negative association between concentrated 
ownership and compliance as one would expect and the results regarding our main hypotheses remain the same. 
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empirical research related to determinants of mandatory disclosure levels and research related 
to goodwill and it impairment testing.9  
In line with prior literature (e.g., Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Hope, 2003; Orij 
2010), we select culture and corruption values based on the country of domicile of each 
company in our sample.10 The CPI is a combination of polls drawing on corruption-related 
data collected by a variety of reputable institutions. It is calculated each year and scores 
countries on how corrupt their public sectors are seen to be. The index captures the informed 
views of analysts, businesspeople and experts in countries around the world. It has been 
validated in 2012 by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (ECJRC) which 
stated that CPI is “conceptually and statistically coherent and with a balanced structure” 
(ECJRC, 2012, p. 21). We note that CPI reports countries with high transparency as top 
scorers, while highly corrupt countries as the lowest scorers. Thus, with respect to H1, we 
expect a positive sign of the coefficient for CPI (i.e., the higher the index, the lower the 
corruption, and as a result the higher the compliance with accounting standards).  
With regard to the data around the cultural dimensions, we use the 2008 release of 
Schwartz’s dataset as reported in Schwartz (2008). As the revised 2008 dimensions are based 
on survey results for the period between 1993 to 2007, they are consistent with the first year 
of the period we focus on. Given that changes in cultural values take place slowly (Schwartz, 
2008), these dimensions appropriately reflect the cultural characteristics across the countries 
in our sample, for the longitudinal period studied.  
                                                 
9 Details on the rationale and theoretical justifications for the inclusion of these control variables can be found in 
Al-Shammari et al., (2008); Glaum et al., (2013); Tsalavoutas et al., (2014; chapter 5), Ramanna and Watts 
(2012) and Knauer and Wohrmann, (2016). 
10 We acknowledge that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of each company 
may have a different cultural and corruption background, compared to the country in which the firm is 
domiciled. Thus, we conducted the following test. We randomly selected 20 firms from our sample and manually 
collected the names of each CEO and CFO from the annual report for the period examined. We then checked 
their nationality through the database BoardEx and found that less than 5% of the firms appointed a CEO and/or 
CFO from a country that is different from the country of domicile of the company.  
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In order to test H1-H4, we run the full model reported in Equation (3) when both culture 
and corruption levels are considered simultaneously. In addition, we estimate Equation (3) 
considering corruption only, without taking into account the influence of culture. And, we 
examine the potential effect of cultural traits only (without corruption) on compliance levels. 
We do these tests, to show the individual effects of corruption and culture. However, such 
testing alone is inherently impaired by an omitted variable (i.e., the country characteristic 
absent in each regression) which may lead to incorrect conclusions regarding either the key 
variable of interest or the control variables included in these regressions. Hence, such analyses 
highlight the importance of including both corruption and culture as potential determinants of 
compliance levels. 
In all regressions, we add industry fixed effect based on Industry Classification 
Benchmark Level 2 industry classification. Further, we also control for cross-sectional and 
time series correlation by clustering by firm and adding year fixed-effects. Moreover, we 
winsorise all the continuous variables at the 2% level on both tails of the distribution. Finally, 
in Section 5, we discuss a range of sensitivity tests.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Compliance with mandatory goodwill disclosures: descriptive statistics  
The compliance levels for mandatory goodwill disclosures are presented in Table 2. Panel A 
shows descriptive statistics for the full sample. The mean (median) degree of compliance 
varies from a minimum of 77.1% (78.2%) in 2008 to a maximum of 86.2% (87.5%) in 2010. 
Moreover, in each year there are firms that provide all the information required in IFRS 3 and 
IAS 36. However, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Al-Akra et al., 2010; Al-Shammari et al., 
2008; Glaum et al., 2013; Hodgdon et al., 2008; Tsalavoutas, 2011), high variation among 
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firms’ compliance levels of disclosure is observed. The standard deviation is around 12.0% 
while minimum compliance levels are about 33%.  
The specific paragraphs that are characterised by lower levels of compliance are those that 
ask companies to portray or discuss proprietary and sensitive information. For example, a 
qualitative description of the factors that make up the goodwill recognised (para B65-e, IFRS 
3), the amount of impairment losses recognised across reported segments (para 129 a, IAS 
36), a description of management’s approach to determining the value(s) assigned to each key 
assumption in its cash flow projections for the calculation of the recoverable amount of each 
cash generating units (para 134 d, IAS 36), and the main events and circumstances that led to 
the recognition of aggregate impairment losses (para 131 b, IAS 36). These elements of 
disclosure are of concern to users of financial statements (FRC, 2014; Henning et al., 2000). 
This is because they, inter alia, act as an “important input to users’ assessment of the amount, 
timing and uncertainty of (the prospect for) future net cash inflows to the entity” (ASBJ et al., 
2014, p. 41). In fact, financial statement preparers themselves, view such disclosures as 
important to shareholders by helping to ensure that companies disclose decision-useful 
proprietary information (ASBJ et al., 2014).  
Given that compliance levels seem to increase over time, panel B presents the results of a 
Cuzick test (a non-parametric test for trend across ordered groups, see Cuzick (1985)). This 
indicates a significant (p<0.01) positive trend in compliance from 2008 to 2011, suggesting 
that sample firms tend to provide an increasing amount of information throughout the period 
examined. We also investigate this trend with Mann-Whitney and T-tests for each pair of 
consecutive years in our sample. A statistically significant (p < 0.01) increase from 2008 to 
2009 and from 2009 to 2010 is reported, while the compliance level with goodwill related 
disclosure seems to decrease slightly from 2010 to 2011.  
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These results are confirmed by the information provided in Panel C. There are far more 
companies in the band of 91% to 100% in 2011 compared to 2008 (68 versus 26 respectively). 
Additionally, a much smaller number of companies in the bands of 31% to 60% features in 
2011 compared to 2008 (6 versus 14 respectively). 
This overall gradual increase in compliance over time may be the result of a learning 
curve in implementing and complying with IFRS. In view of this, when we run our 
multivariate analyses for testing our hypotheses, we replicate the tests by substituting the 
dependent variable of actual compliance levels with the difference from year to year. 
Effectively, these analyses shed more light as to whether not only firms operating in countries 
with specific cultural and corruption characteristics tend to comply more or less in general, 
but also whether the compliance levels in those countries increase at a higher or lower rate 
over time. We discuss these results within sub-sections 4.3 and 4.4.  
Panel D provides the mean (median) levels of disclosure for each country during the 
period examined. Descriptive statistics provide a prima facie confirmation that compliance 
levels may vary according to shared country-level characteristics such as corruption and 
culture. For example, the average compliance level for firms operating in Scandinavian 
countries such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland is above 80%, whereas, Spanish 
and Portuguese firms comply on average with less than 75% of the items required by IFRS 3 
and IAS 36. Untabulated analysis of variance (ANOVA) suggests that the differences in these 
mean values across these countries are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 (Panel A) shows descriptive statistics for CPI and Schwartz’s (2008) cultural 
dimensions used in our analysis, at a country level. This shows a range of values between all 
of the countries for corruption, and in relation to the relevant cultural dimensions. The 
corruption scores are presented annually and show that Scandinavian countries (e.g., 
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Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) are those in which the lowest corruption is perceived 
according to CPI, while Greece and Italy are considered the countries with the highest 
corruption levels.  
To highlight the variation in cultural dimensions within our sample we note the following. 
Countries with low scores for Hierarchy are Norway, Italy, Belgium, and Austria while 
highest values are shown for UK and Switzerland. Furthermore, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, the 
UK and Netherlands are the countries with highest Mastery scores. In contrast, Finland and 
France show the lowest scores for Mastery. Moving on to Embeddedness, we note that 
Germany, Austria and Sweden have low scores for Embeddedness compared to those in Italy, 
Norway and Portugal.      
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 (Panel B) shows descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our analysis. These 
reveal, inter alia, that a large proportion of our sample firms have a significant amount of 
goodwill on their balance sheets (mean (median) goodwill to book value of equity (GdwBV) 
is 71.7% (51.6%)), have conducted material business combinations (mean MaterialBC is 
73.4%) and meet the market expectations in terms of recognising a goodwill impairment loss 
(mean MrktMet is 72.8%),  
 
4.2 Univariate analysis (H1 - H4) 
Table 4 presents Pearson’s correlation coefficients between all variables. Our two measures 
for compliance with goodwill disclosure (Disc and DiscRank) correlate highly positively and 
significantly (0.964, p<0.01). Following the literature suggesting interdependence of 
corruption and cultural variables, CPI shows positive correlation coefficients with Hierarchy 
and Mastery (0.091 and 0.138, significant at the 5% and 1% levels respectively). The 
correlation between CPI and Embeddedness is negative, with a correlation coefficient of -
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0.495 (p<0.01). These correlation coefficients mean that the higher Embeddedness, lower 
Mastery and lower Hierarchy are associated with higher levels of perceived corruption in a 
country.11 Further, cultural dimensions (Hierarchy, Mastery, and Embeddedness) correlate 
positively and significantly (p<0.01) which confirms that these variables are capturing 
different aspects of the same underlying phenomenon, namely national culture.  
Consistent with our first hypothesis, preliminary evidence shows a positive and 
statistically significant correlation between compliance levels and CPI (p<0.01). However, 
we notice no significant univariate correlation between Hierarchy and compliance levels (H2). 
A positive and statistically significant correlation between compliance levels and Mastery 
(H3) is observed (p<0.01), as hypothesised. No significant univariate correlation is observed 
between Embeddedness and compliance levels (H4). These results are based on a univariate 
correlation, which may be affected by correlated omitted variables. Thus, results are further 
explored with multivariate analysis in the following section.  
Compliance with goodwill disclosure is also positively correlated with the presence of a 
material impairment loss (MaterialIL, p<0.01) and negatively associated with material 
business combinations (MaterialBC, p<0.01). This implies that when experiencing a material 
impairment loss (business combination) firms tend to disclose (withhold) more, albeit not 
necessarily fully compliant, information in their annual report. Finally, we note that, in line 
with prior literature (Glaum et al., 2013; Tsalavoutas et al., 2014), both Audit and 
Enforcement document a positive and highly significant relation with our measures for 
disclosure (significant at 1% level).  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
11 The aforementioned relationships within cultural dimensions and between these and corruption may be a 
potential cause of concern in estimating Equation (3). We explicitly deal with potential endogeneity problems as 
discussed in the sensitivity analyses - see Section 5. 
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4.3 Multivariate analyses (H1 – H4) 
Table 5 reports results for multivariate analysis testing the effect of country cultural 
dimensions and corruption on compliance levels with goodwill related disclosure. Models 1 
and 2 consider corruption only in estimating Equation (3), while models 3 and 4 examine the 
potential effect of cultural traits only. More importantly for this research, models 5 and 6 
simultaneously capture both culture and corruption as determinants of compliance with 
goodwill disclosure requirements and hence, provide the testing of our hypotheses.   
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
The results support H1: firms in countries with lower levels of corruption (i.e., higher 
CPI) are more compliant and, thus, disclose more information. The coefficient for CPI is 
positive as expected and statistically significant across all relevant model’s specification 
(always at the 1% level). The multivariate analysis also supports H2 and H3, given that the 
coefficients for hierarchy and mastery are as hypothesised and statistically significant 
(negative coefficient for Hierarchy, p<0.05 in models 3 and 4, p<0.01 in models 5 and 6; 
positive coefficient for Mastery, p<0.01 across all models). Drawing on the coefficients for 
Embeddedness, these are negative and significant (p<0.05) in models 3 and 4 where culture 
only is considered as determinant of compliance with disclosure requirements. However, 
indicative of the limitations of models 1-4 which lack one of the two country characteristics, 
Embeddedness becomes non-significant when we include CPI in the models (i.e., in models 5 
and 6). Therefore, our results are not consistent with H4.  
As discussed previously (sub-section 4.1), we observed an increase in compliance levels 
over the sample period (see Table 2). In view of this, we replicate the tests presented above 
(Table 5) by substituting the actual compliance levels with the difference from year to year 
(i.e., Disc and DiscRank) and report them in Table 6. Inevitably, this results in the number 
of observations dropping from 779 to 581, based upon three years of changes. These tests 
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confirm and extend the reported results relative to our hypotheses, showing also that 
Corruption and the cultural dimensions of hierarchy and mastery are significant determinants 
(at the 1% level) of changes in disclosure levels over time. More specifically, these analyses 
show that the increase in compliance with goodwill related mandatory disclosure over time is 
more pronounced for firms operating in countries with certain characteristics (low Corruption, 
low Hierarchy, high Mastery). Hence, not only do companies’ compliance levels directionally 
vary in accordance with these country characteristics (Table 5) but also the compliance levels 
change over time at a rate which is directionally reflective of these characteristics (Table 6). 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.4 Discussion of empirical findings in relation to H1 – H4 
On reflection of our hypotheses, the following inferences arise from the results presented in 
Tables 5 and 6. First, the lower the corruption in a country the higher the levels of compliance 
and increase in compliance levels with goodwill disclosures over time. Prior literature 
indicates that high levels of corruption are associated with a low quality of accounting (c.f., 
Fan et al., 2014), as manifested in less transparent financial statements (c.f., Kimbro, 2002; 
DiRienzo, 2007; Houqe and Monem, 2016) and earnings opacity (c.f., Picur, 2004; Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2004). Thus, our findings extend this strand of the accounting literature by showing 
that corruption is also related to compliance levels and change in these levels with mandatory 
accounting disclosures, in particular with goodwill related disclosures which are sensitive and 
associated with proprietary information. This serves to confirm the tentative findings of 
Agyei-Mensah, (2017a; b) in respect of country level corruption and firm levels of accounting 
disclosure and compliance.  
Second, in support of the call for empirical evidence testing this assertion (e.g., Akman, 
2011; Hope, 2003; Husted, 1999; Jaggi and Low, 2000), culture is also associated with 
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compliance levels with accounting disclosures associated with proprietary information, while 
controlling for the role of corruption. However, not all cultural traits seem to be influencing 
compliance levels, when corruption levels are also considered (Table 5, models 5 & 6). Our 
results reveal that in countries with higher values of the hierarchy dimension (i.e., higher 
values of wealth, social power and authority in a society) compliance levels and the increase 
in compliance levels over time tend to be lower. This suggests that the distance between 
managers as agents and stakeholders as principals is amplified in such societies, giving rise to 
higher agency costs. Hence, managers in these countries, due to their privileged position, 
seem to maintain as much control over their firm as possible, thus preserving their control 
over firm specific and proprietary information. Additionally, in countries with higher values 
of the mastery dimension (i.e., where higher values of being independent, capable, influential, 
ambitious, successful and choosing one's own goals prevail) compliance with mandatory 
goodwill disclosures and the increase in compliance levels over time are higher. In such 
environments self-assertion and the desire to get ahead of others accentuate active mastery 
(Chui et al., 2002), encouraging ambition in pursuit of managers’ individual goals. 
Effectively, in environments with higher mastery values, managers positively influence 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements to signal their credibility and capability 
to shareholders, to avoid potential litigation risk and reputational harm, and thus portraying 
compliant behaviour. This is particularly relevant as it is perceived to help them become more 
successful in their competitive environment (Jaggi and Low, 2000), in line with the market-
related measure known as “the market for managerial skills” (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 
1983b). As Leventis (2001, p. 29) explains: “Management reputation, in terms of efficiency 
and honesty, is reflected in the labour market (Fama, 1980). The labour market, in the long 
run, rewards managers that have achieved high performance and punishes dishonest and 
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unsuccessful managers. Thus, managers have incentives to be sound stewards and so to use 
financial information for the benefit of the company (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985)”. 
However, these findings provide no support for our fourth hypothesis. Embeddedness 
appears not to be associated with compliance levels with goodwill related disclosure or 
changes in these levels. Although this finding seems somewhat counter-intuitive, it can be 
interpreted as follows. In Schwartz’s (1994) depiction of the cultural dimensions 
embeddedness was entitled as conservatism. The underlying value items in these dimensions 
(1994 vs. 2008) are almost identical so although these dimensions have changed their names, 
the cultural values they represent, do not change. Chui et al. (2002) argue that conservatism 
occurs in societies where values such as harmony and propriety in person-to-group relations 
are favoured. Further, an additional feature of this dimension is that of respecting the family 
and respecting the elders. Abdullah et al. (2015), with reference to Ball et al. (2003), indicate 
that there is no need for mandatory disclosure in such settings. Thus, proprietary information 
required in goodwill related disclosure is more likely revealed through alternative, informal 
channels and less through formal annual reports. This line of argument is supported by the 
findings of Glaum et al. (2013) who report that their measure of conservatism is negatively 
associated with disclosure compliance. Finally, the component reciprocation of favours also 
present in this dimension is effectively captured by corruption for which we control in our 
multivariate analyses. Corruption is influenced by social networks (Lόpez and Santos, 2014) 
and networks are favoured in countries with high embeddedness. This makes disclosures in 
annual reports less relevant. Thus, given the diversity of values included in embeddedness, 
potentially leading to opposite behaviours with regard to compliance, may result in this 
dimension having an insignificant overall effect. 
Moving to the control variables, goodwill to book value of equity (GdwBV), material 
impairment loss (MaterialIL), meeting the market expectation in terms of goodwill 
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impairment loss (MrktMet) and Size are positively and significantly correlated to compliance 
levels across all models. Similar to the univariate analysis, material business combination 
(MaterialBC) is significantly and negatively associated to compliance levels. In addition, 
Leverage, Audit, and AbsDisc seem to play a role in explaining compliance with goodwill 
related disclosures, albeit not consistent across all models. Such results are broadly in line 
with previous studies examining the determinants of compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements (e.g., Akhtaruddin, 2005; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Glaum and Street, 2003; 
Glaum et al. 2013; Hope, 2003). Finally, with specific regard to enforcement, we note the 
following. Enforcement has a non-significant coefficient in models 5 and 6, while it only 
appears to be a significant determinant of compliance levels when only the role of corruption 
is examined and the role of cultural traits is ignored (i.e., models 1 & 2). This finding supports 
our simultaneous examination of corruption and culture as potential determinants of 
compliance levels and reflects on Brown et al.’s (2014) suggestion that culture will influence 
the output of financial reporting, even when one controls for enforcement. 
 
5. Sensitivity analyses12 
5.1 Endogeneity 
One potential concern with results in Tables 5 and 6 is that corruption is not an exogenous 
variable. Prior literature argues that Corruption is a cultural phenomenon (e.g., Davis and 
Ruhe, 2003; Getz and Volkema, 2001; Park, 2003) and that cultural values impact on business 
practices of which corruption is one form (Husted, 1999). Therefore, we proceed in further 
analysis with regard to the tests in Tables 5 and 6 and control for potential endogeneity bias in 
the following way.  
                                                 
12 Tables reporting these results are available on request. 
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First, we reflect on the solution to use instrumental variable methods (c.f., Duong et al., 
2016; Griffin et al., 2017). However, in our context, it is difficult to find an instrument which 
is purely exogenous (Larker and Rusticus, 2010).13 Thus, we rely on Nikolaev and Van Lent 
(2005) suggesting that fixed effects estimations in a panel data-set can reduce endogeneity 
and produce consistent estimators (see Mazzi et al., 2017 for more details) and we rerun our 
models in Tables 5 and 6 accordingly. Results are qualitatively similar to our main tests.  
Second, we consider that cultural dimensions and corruption may have similar traits and 
thus share large part of their variance. Following Ding et al. (2005), we conduct a factor 
analysis of the cultural dimensions (hierarchy, mastery, and embeddedness) and the CPI using 
a principal component extraction method with a varimax rotation. We select factors only if 
their eigenvalue is greater than one (Hair et al., 1998). The results of this analysis reveal that a 
two-factor solution clearly appears, explaining 72.6% of the variance, which is in line with the 
results in Ding et al. (2005). Using the rotated factors, we predict Factor1 which is mainly 
driven by CPI, and Factor2 which is mainly representative of mastery. We then replicate our 
multivariate analysis introducing the two above-mentioned factors, which are orthogonal by 
construction. The results of this analysis show that our new variables correlate positively and 
significantly with compliance with goodwill accounting disclosure levels across all models. A 
positive coefficient was expected given the main drivers of the two factors extracted. 
Finally, we assume that corruption may be considered a product of culture. In light of 
this, we adopt a two-step methodology. First, we estimate a regression model where CPI is 
determined by hierarchy, mastery and embeddedness. Then, we estimate the residuals from 
this regression in order to identify the variance of corruption which is not explained by 
                                                 
13 We acknowledge that Duong et al. (2016) and Griffin et al. (2017) identify innovative datasets for the use of 
instrumental variables when they examine the influence of culture on corporate governance (e.g., ethnical and 
language fractionalisation (Duong et al., 2016) and the degree to which a language permits pronoun-dropping in 
a sentence (Griffin et al., 2017)). However, it is difficult to justify why these variables would be correlated with 
culture but not with corruption in a given country. Hence, we refrain from using them as instruments in our 
context.  
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cultural dimensions. We replicate our main tests replacing CPI with the residuals from the 
regression described above. The results from these tests are qualitatively similar with those 
presented in Table 5, except for the fact that Embeddedness shows a negative and significant 
coefficient (p<0.01). 
 
5.2 Alternative cultural dimensions 
Another potential concern with our main results is that we rely on Schwartz’s (2008) cultural 
dimensions. However, many prior studies have adopted Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (e.g., 
Gleason et al., 2000; Han et al., 2010; Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai, 2007), although they have 
been subject to criticism and may be outdated (Baskerville, 2003; Gernon and Wallace, 1995; 
McSweeney, 2002). Despite these criticisms, in this section, we provide a set of robustness 
tests drawing on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. 
Although Schwartz’s and Hofstede’s dimensions do not capture the same cultural 
phenomena, we matched hierarchy with powerdistance, mastery with masculinity, and 
embeddedness with individualism (Fairbairn, 2014 p. 117-118). We then replicate our 
multivariate analysis employing these variables instead. The results of these tests show that 
Corruption continues to play a role in explaining compliance levels. Powerdistance is 
positively and significantly (p<0.01) related to Disc and DiscRank, thus confirming results 
for Hierarchy. Individualism is not significantly related to Disc and DiscRank, thus 
confirming results for embeddedness. Finally, the coefficient for masculinity is positive as 
expected albeit not significant. 
 
5.3 Alternative corruption measure 
Although the CPI provided by Transparency International was validated in 2012 by the 
European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (ECJRC), we acknowledge that other methods 
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for measuring Corruption in a country exist. Thus, we run additional tests replacing CPI with 
a measure for Bribery and Corruption (BribCorr) provided by the International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD) Yearbook (2013). Since 1989, the yearbook benchmarks 
the performance of 60 countries, measuring the different facets of competitiveness, grouped 
into economic performance, government efficiency, business efficiency, and infrastructure. 
BribCorr offers a reliable proxy for the absence of corruption in a country. Thus, in line with 
the hypothesis set for CPI, we expect a positive relation between BribCorr and compliance 
with goodwill related mandatory disclosures levels. Results confirm our main analysis, since 
the coefficient for BribCorr is positive and significant (p<0.01) across all models, while 
hierarchy and mastery continue to play a role (p<0.01).  
 
5.4 Controlling for additional country characteristics and proxies of financial reporting 
quality 
Although our regressions control for various country characteristics, one could be concerned 
that the corruption and cultural dimensions we use capture country characteristics we do not 
control for. Thus, we expand our analyses by adding a number of variables, in different steps.  
First, we add four further country controls as provided by La Porta et al. (2006) and La 
Porta et al. (1998): a) the index of investigative powers; b) an index reflecting the assessment 
of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment; c) rule of law (code vs. common law); 
and d) an index capturing the companies’ transparency, mainly relating to shareholders’ and 
directors’ transactions and activities. The results from these tests illustrate that the main 
analyses presented in the paper and the deriving conclusions do not change.  
Second, we subsequently supplement these already augmented regressions by including a 
control for Investor Protection (La Porta et al., 2008) and Market Development (market 
capitalization over GDP). The results from these tests indicate that the coefficients of these 
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new control variables are insignificant and confirm our results for Corruption, Mastery, and 
Embeddedness. It is only that the coefficient for Hierarchy is still negative, but insignificant. 
However, we are cautious about these results because, by adding these two additional country 
variables, our model now includes 12 country variables in total. Thus, there is severe concern 
of multicollinearity which raises doubts about the reliability of the coefficients obtained.  
Third, we consider that the enforcement in the US is very strong and that cross-listing in 
the US would result in stronger/additional monitoring from shareholders and analysts. Thus, 
we perceive that such a binary variable may limit the influence of the features (i.e., corruption 
and culture) of country of domicile. Hence, we generated a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the US and 0 otherwise. Approximately 25% of our 
sample firms are cross-listed in the US. We then we repeat the tests presented in Tables 5 and 
6 while also including USCrosslisting as additional control variable in our models. Results 
obtained show that our main findings are unchanged and the coefficient for this particular 
variable is negative, as one would expect, but insignificant.  
Fourth, arguably, our measure of compliance with goodwill mandatory disclosures could 
act as a proxy for other types of information quality. As a result, what our results pick up may 
be the influence of corruption and cultural traits on other types of financial reporting quality. 
Thus, we collected additional data to further expand our analyses. First, we control for 
earnings management by computing and introducing absolute value of abnormal working 
capital accruals scaled by total assets (i.e., AWCA), as developed by De Fond and Park 
(2001). Second, we count the number of pages of the annual reports of the observations 
included in the sample and we compute and introduce as an additional control the negative 
logarithmic transformation of annual report page count (i.e., Readability). The results from 
these tests illustrate that the analyses presented in the paper and the deriving conclusions do 
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not change. Further, in most of the regressions performed, the coefficients of these two 
additional controls are not-significant.  
Finally, we reflect on our observation of increasing compliance levels of the sample 
period (see discussion in sub-section 4.1). Hence, we conduct two tests to control for this. As 
a first step, we created a trend variable equal to 1 for 2008, 2 for 2009, 3, for 2010 and 4 for 
2011 and we included it as a further control variable in our regressions, while excluding the 
time dummies originally included to avoid multicollinearity. The results obtained indicate 
that, indeed, the trend variable reports a positive and significant coefficient. However, the 
results we present in the paper and relate to our hypotheses do not change. As a second step, 
we reasoned that compliance level of firm i in year t may be affected by the compliance level 
of the same firm in year t-1. This is controlled in the tests reported in Table 6. However, we 
repeat the analysis reported in Table 5 by including as an additional control the lagged value 
of compliance level (i.e., L_Disc and L_DiscRank). Results obtained show that compliance 
level at t-1 is positively correlated with the compliance level at time t. However, the influence 
of culture and corruption on compliance level at time t is as we report in Table 5. 
 
6. Conclusions 
There is evidence from practice (ESMA, 2013) and academic studies (Glaum et al., 2013; 
Tsalavoutas et al., 2014) of non-compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. In this 
research, we specifically focus on and measure levels of compliance with goodwill related 
mandatory disclosures using a panel dataset of European companies, for 2008 to 2011. In 
doing so, we examined the extent to which corruption and culture, as two country factors, 
simultaneously influence the level and change over time of the compliance identified. 
Our findings reveal varying levels of non-compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements allowing for the conclusion that, although companies are expected to comply 
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with mandated disclosures, they rarely do so in full. Additionally, we find that higher levels of 
perceived corruption in a country and higher values of the hierarchy (mastery) dimension are 
associated with lower (higher) compliance levels and their changes over time.  
From these results the following academic contributions as well as practical and social 
implications arise. First, in the prior cross-country studies that have examined determinants of 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures (Glaum et al, 2013; Tsalavoutas et al., 2014), 
the potential influence of Corruption in particular and Culture generally have been ignored. 
Thus, our analysis reflects on Jaggi and Low (2000), Husted (1999), Hope (2003), Malagueño 
et al. (2010), Akman (2011) and Houqe and Monem (2016) who explicitly call for such 
investigations. Second, the prior compliance studies focus on either single countries (e.g., 
Tsalavoutas, 2011) or a single year immediately following the widespread adoption of IFRS 
in 2005 (e.g., Glaum et al., 2013; Tsalavoutas, 2011). It is known that, for the latter, 
compliance levels were sensitive to lack of knowledge and experience effects (Kvaal and 
Nobes, 2012). In contrast, our research examines a recent longitudinal period which allows us 
to examine the influence of Corruption and Culture on compliance levels across countries and 
over time. Finally, given that we control for audit and enforcement mechanisms at a country 
level, our findings lend support to Nobes (2006), Weetman (2006) and Brown et al. (2014) 
who argue that strong enforcement mechanisms alone are not a sufficient condition for 
financial reporting compliance.  
As far as practical implications are concerned, first, it has been argued by regulators 
(IASB, 2013; Mobus, 2005) that mandatory accounting disclosures through IFRS are a 
potential tool of public policy aiming to increase transparency and comparability of reporting 
to fulfil the information needs of investors and wider stakeholders (Abdullah et al., 2015; 
IASB, 2013; Schipper, 2007). Our findings indicate that the extent to which these objectives 
are achieved is, in part, dependent upon country levels of Corruption and cultural traits. Thus, 
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the assertion of Hodgdon et al. (2008) concerning the importance of compliance being equal 
to the importance of the standards themselves remains pertinent: a lack of transparency via 
non-compliance casts a shadow over the decision-usefulness and stewardship purposes of 
financial reporting enshrined within the Conceptual Framework (Clements et al., 2009; 
Frecka, 2007; Schipper, 2007), potentially leading to a loss in investor trust (Chartered 
Financial Analysts’ Institute, 2013). Following on from this, our findings support Verhezen 
(2010) in the need for regulation to consider and foster a more compliant disclosure culture 
based on managerial integrity. This would deviate from a focus on enforcement which 
currently recognises, through its inherent existence, a lack of compliance and moral muteness 
(Bird and Waters, 1989).  
Second, and specifically, with respect to country corruption, the findings would question 
the assumption advanced in recent research that corruption affects financial reporting 
practices in a developing country environment (e.g., Lourenço et al., 2017; Agyei-Mensah, 
2017b). The results of this research indicate that levels of corruption in a developed country 
context, such as those in EU countries, also influences the financial reporting process and 
levels of compliance in particular. 
Third, the importance of our findings is enhanced by the fact that they specifically address 
goodwill related disclosures. Goodwill is of significant economic importance (EFRAG, 2016) 
and is a complex accounting area, for instance, due to the use of managerial assumptions 
around its impairment testing (ESMA, 2015; Giner and Pardo, 2015; Mazzi et al., 2016; 
Petersen and Plenborg, 2010). Further, its continued presence on IASB agendas (EFRAG, 
2016) is indicative of regulatory concern. Finally, within Europe specifically, the topic has 
attracted considerable attention from ESMA (2013; 2015). 
From a wider social perspective, the International Ethics Standards Board of Accountants 
(IESBA) “Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants” issued by the International 
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Federation of Accountants (IFAC) specifies compliance with accounting standards and 
regulations to ensure transparency of information. Thus, non-compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures is also an ethical concern facing the global accounting profession 
(Choi and Pae, 2011; Labelle et al., 2010; Rockness and Rockness, 2005; Staubus, 2005).  
Finally, we observe some limitations of this study, which provide suggestions for future 
research in this area. First, we only examined compliance relevant to the mandatory reporting 
requirements for goodwill. Future research could examine other accounting standards/topics 
to provide further insights. Second, future research could extend the time period of analysis 
undertaken in this study. We would argue that country features such as culture and corruption 
do not change significantly within a relatively short period of time (Duong et al., 2016: 68; 
Houqe and Monem, 2016). We would thus contend that the results regarding our hypotheses 
would not differ if our data finished two-three years later. However, this research specifically 
examined the period during and immediately after the financial crisis in Europe, it would be 
interesting to compare levels of mandatory compliance between different periods of economic 
prosperity (i.e., from 2012 onwards). Third, our research focuses only on European countries. 
Future studies may wish to extend our analysis regarding the effect of corruption and culture 
on compliance levels in different jurisdictions, by including other countries which have 
adopted IFRS or their national standards have substantially converged with IFRS (e.g., South 
Africa, Malaysia, Australia and China). Fourth, this research was limited to the development 
and statistical testing of a disclosure index and was based on single measures of corruption 
and culture. Future research could usefully examine the views of users of financial statements, 
through interview or survey. Fifth, from our checklist one cannot distinguish if information 
that is absent is omitted because companies want to prevent the disclosure of good or bad 
news or simply proprietary information. One can only speculate. One possible way to capture 
this would be to undertake interviews with management which would be appropriate for a 
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more qualitative-based study, examining a smaller sample. Finally, after the period we cover 
in our study, there have been some minor amendments in IAS 36. These relate to fair value 
measurement information when a company elects fair value less cost to sell as the model for 
goodwill impairment testing. Hence, we acknowledge that our research instrument cannot 
capture companies’ disclosure practices in this respect and future research can shed light on 
this.  
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Appendix – Variables’ definition 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE AND CODE 
Disc Disclosure level (c.f., Section 3.2 for further information) Hand-collected 
DiscRank Percentile ranking transformation of Disc (cfr. Section 3.2 for further information) Hand-collected 
CPI Corruption Perceptions Index – the lower the index the stronger the perceived corruption in a country Transparency International 
Hierarchy Country cultural dimension Schwartz (2008) 
Mastery Country cultural dimension Schwartz (2008) 
Embeddedness Country cultural dimension Schwartz (2008) 
GdwBV Goodwill to book value of equity 
Goodwill: Compustat GDW 
Book value: Datastream WC03501 
MaterialIL 
Dummy variable equal to 1 in case a firm experienced a material impairment loss on goodwill (more 
than 5% of goodwill at beginning of year as reported in the financial statements) and 0 otherwise 
Hand-collected 
MaterialBC 
Dummy variable equal to 1 in case a firm experienced a material business combination (more than 5% 
of total assets or sales at beginning of year as reported in the financial statements) and 0 otherwise  
Hand-collected 
Mrktmet 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm meets the market expectation with regard to recognition of 
goodwill impairment loss calculated according to Ramanna and Watts (2012) and 0 otherwise 
Hand-collected 
Size Natural logarithm of market value at beginning of year Market value: Datastream WC08001 
Leverage Ratio between total debt and book value of equity 
Total debt: Datastream WC03255 
Book value: Datastream WC03501 
Liquidity Ratio between current assets and current liabilities 
Current assets: Datastream WC02201 
Current liabilities: Datastream WC03101 
ROA Return on assets calculated as the ratio between net income and total assets 
Net income: Datastream WC01751 
Total assets: Datastream WC02999 
StrategicOwn 
Proportion of shares belonging to institutional investors and pension funds who hold more than 5% of 
companies’ shares 
% shares inst. inv.: Datastream NOSHIC 
% shares pen. fund: Datastream NOSHIC 
Number of Shares: Datastream NOSH 
Audit 
Index capturing the strength of the auditing mechanisms – the higher the index the stronger the audit 
mechanisms in a country 
Brown et al. (2014) 
Enforcement 
Index capturing the enforcement of accounting standards – the higher the index the stronger the 
enforcement mechanisms in a country 
Brown et al. (2014) 
AbsDisc 
Index capturing the differences between countries national GAAPs and IFRSs as the extent to which 
the rules regarding certain accounting issues are missing in national GAAPs while covered in IFRSs – 
the higher the index, the higher the difference between GAAPs and IFRSs. 
Ding et al. (2007) 
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Figure 1 – Schwartz’s (2008) cultural dimensions 
 
Two-dimensional smallest space analysis diagram, showing Schwartz’s revised cultural dimensions 
from 2008 and their value items (Schwartz, 2008: 66). 
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Table 1 – Sample summary statistics 
Panel A – Sample selection process 
The sample selection process considers as a starting point the S&P EU350 constituents as of December 2011. 
n firms 
dropped 
Reason for dropping 
68 classified as Financials 
33 not continuously present in S&P EU350 from 2008 to 2011 
4 reporting under U.S. GAAP 
1 reporting under U.S. GAAP until 2009 and under IFRS from 2010 onwards 
1 split into two companies in 2011 
1 resulted from a merger in 2009  
1 delisted in 2012; annual report for 2011 not publicly available  
2 changed annual report ending period 
5 present twice in the S&P EU350 constituents a 
9 no goodwill for at least one financial year examined 
1 2010 annual report not retrievable in English  
2 missing country controls for Luxembourg 
128 total firms excluded 
222 N final sample - firms 
888 
n observations  
14 dropped because of negative book value of equity  
95 dropped because goodwill to book value of equity below 5% 
779 final sample – firm-year observations 
Panel B – Sample constituents by Country and Industry  
 ICB industry classificationb  
Country 
Basic 
mat. 
Cons. 
goods 
Cons. 
services 
Health 
care 
Indus- 
trials 
Oil and 
gas 
Tech-
nology 
Telec. Utilities TOT 
Austria 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 10 
Belgium 6 4 4 4 0 0 0 4 0 22 
Denmark 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 12 
Finland 4 0 0 0 8 0 4 0 0 16 
France 4 32 36 8 40 4 12 4 16 156 
Germany 16 19 8 8 19 0 6 4 8 88 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 
Italy 0 8 4 0 8 8 4 4 4 40 
Netherland 8 8 7 0 4 0 3 4 0 34 
Norway 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 13 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 4 12 
Spain 0 0 0 0 12 8 0 4 4 28 
Sweden 8 10 0 0 34 0 4 8 0 64 
Switzerland 12 6 0 12 4 0 0 4 0 38 
UK 17 40 68 12 52 4 16 10 19 238 
TOT 84 131 127 48 193 30 49 62 55 779 
a To avoid double counting, firms that are cross-listed in more than one European market are included in our 
sample once, based only on the country of primary listing. 
b Based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) Level 2. 
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Table 2 – Compliance levels with goodwill mandatory disclosure 
Panel A – Descriptive statistics by year 
Statistics 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-2011 
Mean 0.771 0.815 0.862 0.841 0.822 
St. dev. 0.116 0.117 0.111 0.116 0.120 
Median 0.782 0.824 0.875 0.857 0.833 
Min 0.333 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.333 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
N 196 193 195 195 779 
Panel B – Test for trend 
Cuzick test a     7.340*** 
 
FOLLOW-UP TEST 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
Mann-Whitney a -3.671*** -4.056*** 1.076* 
T-test a -3.700*** -4.071*** 1.796** 
Panel C – Frequency by level of compliance and year  
Level 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-2011 
% n % n % n % n % n % 
31-40 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.1 
41-50 3 1.5 3 1.6 2 1.0 1 0.5 9 1.2 
51-60 10 5.1 9 4.7 4 2.0 5 2.5 28 3.5 
61-70 40 20.4 22 11.4 7 3.6 18 9.2 87 11.2 
71-80 55 28.1 42 21.7 36 18.5 36 18.5 169 21.7 
81-90 61 31.1 67 34.7 61 31.3 67 34.4 256 32.9 
91-100 26 13.3 50 25.9 85 43.6 68 34.9 229 29.4 
N 196 100.0 193 100.0 195 100.0 195 100.0 779 100.0 
Panel D – Mean (median) by country and year 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-2011 
Austria 0.746 (0.746) 0.854 (0.854) 0.839 (0.955) 0.824 (0.857) 0.819 (0.854) 
Belgium 0.713 (0.739) 0.765 (0.833) 0.739 (0.750) 0.738 (0.746) 0.738 (0.750) 
Denmark 0.839 (0.875) 0.917 (0.933) 0.923 (1.000) 0.952 (1.000) 0.908 (0.967) 
Finland 0.777 (0.774) 0.821 (0.813) 0.838 (0.835) 0.926 (0.946) 0.841 (0.850) 
France 0.736 (0.741) 0.754 (0.765) 0.796 (0.813) 0.753 (0.750) 0.760 (0.765) 
Germany 0.761 (0.763) 0.832 (0.846) 0.914 (0.923) 0.895 (0.913) 0.850 (0.878) 
Greece 0.727 (0.727) 0.769 (0.769) 1.000 (1.000) 0.579 (0.579) 0.769 (0.748) 
Ireland 0.857 (0.857) 0.952 (0.952) 1.000 (1.000) 0.950 (0.950) 0.940 (0.951) 
Italy 0.750 (0.771) 0.814 (0.786) 0.872 (0.873) 0.865 (0.847) 0.825 (0.815) 
Netherlands 0.798 (0.792) 0.784 (0.836) 0.842 (0.824) 0.859 (0.901) 0.821 (0.835) 
Norway 0.837 (0.815) 0.776 (0.800) 0.892 (0.941) 0.867 (0.835) 0.845 (0.821) 
Portugal 0.714 (0.706) 0.719 (0.769) 0.681 (0.688) 0.746 (0.765) 0.715 (0.735) 
Spain 0.655 (0.615) 0.699 (0.692) 0.753 (0.765) 0.759 (0.778) 0.717 (0.725) 
Sweden 0.791 (0.786) 0.818 (0.824) 0.889 (0.889) 0.878 (0.867) 0.842 (0.852) 
Switzerland 0.822 (0.824) 0.861 (0.889) 0.916 (0.920) 0.874 (0.894) 0.870 (0.889) 
UK 0.799 (0.825) 0.862 (0.889) 0.897 (0.917) 0.874 (0.889) 0.858 (0.870) 
Disclosure level varies between 0 and 1 and is calculated as the ratio of the total items disclosed by a company 
to the maximum number of applicable items for that company.  
a Cuzick test is a non-parametric test for trend across ordered groups (see Cuzick, 1985). Mann-Whitney and 
T-test examine the median and mean differences between two periods respectively. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics 
Panel A – Descriptive statistics for cultural dimensions and corruption 
 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
Cultural dimensions  
(Schwartz, 2008) 
Country CPI 2008 CPI 2009 CPI 2010 CPI 2011 
Average 
CPI 
Hierarchy Mastery 
Embedded- 
ness 
Austria 8.100 7.900 7.900 7.787 7.922  1.750 3.920 3.110 
Belgium 7.300 7.100 7.100 7.487 7.247  1.690 3.840 3.250 
Denmark 9.300 9.300 9.300 9.392 9.323  1.860 3.910 3.190 
Finland 9.000 8.900 9.200 9.404 9.126  1.800 3.660 3.370 
France 6.900 6.900 6.800 7.005 6.901  2.210 3.720 3.200 
Germany 7.900 8.000 7.900 8.046 7.962  1.820 3.930 3.095 
Greece 4.700 3.800 3.500 3.389 3.847  1.830 4.250 3.410 
Ireland 7.700 8.000 8.000 7.536 7.809  2.090 4.040 3.410 
Italy 4.800 4.300 3.900 3.907 4.227  1.600 3.810 3.460 
Netherland 8.900 8.900 8.800 8.894 8.874  1.910 3.970 3.190 
Norway 7.900 8.600 8.600 8.990 8.523  1.490 3.850 3.450 
Portugal 6.100 5.800 6.000 6.098 6.000  1.890 4.110 3.430 
Spain 6.500 6.100 6.100 6.230 6.233  1.840 3.800 3.310 
Sweden 9.300 9.200 9.200 9.298 9.250  1.830 3.810 3.120 
Switzerland 9.000 9.000 8.700 8.802 8.876  2.240 3.855 3.190 
UK 7.700 7.700 7.600 7.775 7.694  2.330 4.010 3.340 
Panel B - Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent  
variables used in the multivariate analysis 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max 
Disc 0.822 0.120 0.333 0.833 1 
DiscRank 0.575 0.278 0.000 0.559 1 
CPI 7.585 1.177 3.389 7.700 9.404 
Hierarchy 2.061 0.257 1.490 2.210 2.330 
Mastery 3.885 0.121 3.660 3.920 4.250 
Embeddedness 3.254 0.109 3.095 3.200 3.460 
GdwBV 0.717 0.917 0.050 0.516 16.900 
MaterialIL 0.087 0.305 0 0 1 
MaterialBC 0.734 0.442 0 1 1 
MrktMet 0.728 0.500 0 1 1 
MV 16,528 21,989 297 7,665 148,082 
Size 9.08 1.110 5.697 8.944 11.906 
Leverage 1.309 3.862 0.000 0.729 97.937 
Liquidity 2.575 18.429 0.195 1.134 286.556 
ROA 0.048 0.06 -0.786 0.045 0.356 
StrategicOwn 0.062 0.081 0.000 0.050 0.510 
Audit 27.529 3.927 17 29 32 
Enforcement 18.46 4.282 8 21 22 
AbsDisc 6.15 5.254 0 8 18 
 
See Appendix for variables’ definitions. 
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Table 4 – Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
 Disc DiscRank CPI Hierarchy Mastery Embeddedness GdwBV  a MaterialIL MaterialBC 
Disc 1         
DiscRank 0.964*** 1        
CPI 0.195*** 0.206*** 1       
Hierarchy 0.060 0.063 0.091** 1      
Mastery 0.232*** 0.253*** 0.138*** 0.257*** 1     
Embeddedness 0.030 0.028 -0.495*** 0.164*** 0.326*** 1    
GdwBV  a 0.106*** 0.117*** -0.064** 0.215*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 1   
MaterialIL 0.192*** 0.209*** 0.038 0.021 0.033 0.017 0.018 1  
MaterialBC -0.142*** -0.129*** 0.014 -0.014 -0.082** -0.042 0.132*** 0.015 1 
MrktMet 0.044 0.055 0.046 -0.009 0.13*** 0.020 0.065* -0.326*** -0.028 
Size 0.048 0.037 -0.054 -0.024 -0.125*** -0.111*** -0.124*** 0.063* 0.174*** 
Leverage a -0.041 -0.023 -0.210*** 0.033 0.176*** 0.191*** 0.397*** 0.011 -0.058 
Liquidity a 0.001 -0.009 0.220*** -0.042 0.001 -0.089** -0.337*** -0.049 -0.096*** 
ROA a 0.035 0.027 0.229*** 0.113*** 0.129*** 0.024 -0.066** -0.259*** -0.006 
StrategicOwn a -0.003 0.011 0.15*** 0.112*** 0.133*** 0.037 0.072** 0.015 -0.098*** 
Audit 0.101*** 0.100*** -0.103*** 0.818*** 0.197*** 0.395*** 0.203*** 0.021 -0.051 
Enforcement 0.165*** 0.174*** -0.050 0.349*** 0.513*** 0.318*** 0.106*** 0.039 -0.081** 
AbsDisc -0.187*** -0.189*** -0.198*** -0.507*** -0.543*** -0.348*** -0.197*** -0.079** 0.024 
(continued next page) 
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 MrktMet Size Leverage a Liquidity a ROA a StrategicOwn a Audit Enforcement AbsDisc 
MrktMet 1         
Size -0.164*** 1        
Leverage a 0.009 -0.056 1       
Liquidity a 0.030 -0.115*** -0.239*** 1      
ROA a 0.145*** 0.158*** -0.086** 0.141*** 1     
StrategicOwn a 0.066* -0.351*** 0.032 0.133*** -0.038 1    
Audit 0.006 -0.048 0.003 -0.070** 0.103*** 0.097*** 1   
Enforcement 0.070** 0.077** -0.034 -0.023 0.084** -0.076** 0.455*** 1  
AbsDisc -0.036 0.158*** 0.040 0.001 -0.126*** -0.233*** -0.623*** -0.333*** 1 
a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
See Appendix for variables’ definitions. 
 
 57 
Table 5 – Regression results for determinants of compliance with mandatory goodwill disclosures 
VARIABLES Corruption only  Culture only 
Culture and 
corruption 
 
Model 1 
Disc 
Model 2 
DiscRank 
Model 3 
Disc 
Model 4  
DiscRank 
Model 5 
Disc 
Model 6 
DiscRank 
Constant 
0.550*** 
(6.43) 
-0.016 
(-0.08) 
0.197 
(0.66) 
-1.183* 
(-1.72) 
-0.527 
(-1.63) 
-2.921*** 
(-3.93) 
CPI 
0.020*** 
(4.95) 
0.049*** 
(4.93) 
  0.027*** 
(5.67) 
0.065*** 
(5.45) 
Hierarchy 
  -0.087** 
(-2.50) 
-0.207** 
(-2.45) 
-0.118*** 
(-3.51) 
-0.279*** 
(-3.53) 
Mastery 
  0.235*** 
(3.26) 
0.649*** 
(3.85) 
0.225*** 
(3.37) 
0.625*** 
(4.00) 
Embeddedness 
  -0.114** 
(-2.36) 
-0.282** 
(-2.42) 
0.044 
(0.90) 
0.098 
(0.81) 
GdwBV  a 
0.037*** 
(4.16) 
0.088*** 
(4.11) 
0.044*** 
(5.00) 
0.105*** 
(5.01) 
0.044*** 
(5.11) 
0.107*** 
(5.15) 
MaterialIL 
0.088*** 
(7.17) 
0.218*** 
(6.98) 
0.094*** 
(7.61) 
0.235*** 
(7.52) 
0.087*** 
(7.23) 
0.217*** 
(7.09) 
MaterialBC 
-0.034*** 
(-3.09) 
-0.082*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.032*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.078*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.033*** 
(-3.13) 
-0.080*** 
(-3.14) 
MrktMet 
0.042*** 
(4.33) 
0.095*** 
(4.09) 
0.038*** 
(3.92) 
0.084*** 
(3.63) 
0.038*** 
(3.95) 
0.083*** 
(3.63) 
Size 
0.006** 
(2.09) 
0.016* 
(1.92) 
0.007** 
(2.19) 
0.019* 
(1.66) 
0.009* 
(1.84) 
0.024** 
(2.14) 
Leverage a 
-0.004 
(-0.68) 
-0.006 
(-0.44) 
-0.011** 
(-2.11) 
-0.026** 
(-2.01) 
-0.009* 
(-1.85) 
-0.022* 
(-1.75) 
Liquidity a 
-0.002 
(-0.22) 
-0.010 
(-0.44) 
0.002 
(0.21) 
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
-0.002 
(-0.26) 
-0.010 
(-0.48) 
ROA a 
-0.042 
(-0.38) 
-0.075 
(-0.29) 
0.049 
(0.46) 
0.134 
(0.54) 
-0.094 
(-0.88) 
-0.211 
(-0.84) 
StrategicOwn a 
-0.048 
(-0.82) 
-0.123 
(-0.91) 
-0.029 
(-0.48) 
-0.080 
(-0.60) 
-0.051 
(-0.84) 
-0.133 
(-0.97) 
Audit 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
-0.001 
(-0.19) 
0.007* 
(1.92) 
0.016** 
(2.02) 
0.010*** 
(2.99) 
0.024*** 
(3.17) 
Enforcement 
0.003** 
(2.20) 
0.007** 
(2.41) 
-0.001 
(-0.55) 
-0.003 
(-0.70) 
-0.001 
(-0.82) 
-0.004 
(-0.98) 
AbsDisc 
-0.003** 
(-1.99) 
-0.006* 
(-1.93) 
-0.001 
(-0.40) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
0.002 
(0.99) 
0.006 
(1.37) 
Industry f.e. Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year f.e. Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 779 779 779 779 779 779 
F 14.45*** 10.05*** 11.75*** 7.84*** 14.29*** 10.59*** 
R2-adj 0.237 0.185 0.230 0.182 0.263 0.217 
Mean VIF 1.73 1.73 2.14 2.14 2.21 2.21 
a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
See Appendix for variables’ definitions. 
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Table 6 – Regression results for determinants of changes in compliance with 
mandatory goodwill disclosures 
 
VARIABLES Corruption only  Culture only Culture and corruption 
 
Model 7 
Disc 
Model 8 
DiscRank 
Model 9 
Disc 
Model 10 
DiscRank 
Model 11 
Disc 
Model 12 
DiscRank 
Constant 
-0.205* 
(-1.85) 
-0.516* 
(-1.91) 
-0.542 
(-1.29) 
-1.625 
(-1.62) 
-1.237*** 
(-2.83) 
-3.245*** 
(-3.09) 
CPI 
0.018*** 
(3.29) 
0.043*** 
(3.05) 
  0.025*** 
(3.80) 
0.058*** 
(3.46) 
Hierarchy 
  -0.123** 
(-2.34) 
-0.273** 
(-2.18) 
-0.156*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.349*** 
(-2.85) 
Mastery 
  0.256*** 
(2.78) 
0.673*** 
(3.01) 
0.251*** 
(2.90) 
0.662*** 
(3.12) 
Embeddedness 
  -0.151** 
(-1.98) 
-0.349* 
(-1.89) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
GdwBV  a 
0.023 
(1.61) 
0.062* 
(1.85) 
0.029** 
(2.04) 
0.077** 
(2.31) 
0.029** 
(2.11) 
0.079** 
(2.39) 
MaterialIL 
0.082*** 
(3.76) 
0.210*** 
(3.82) 
0.088*** 
(3.97) 
0.224*** 
(4.04) 
0.081*** 
(3.66) 
0.208*** 
(3.73) 
MaterialBC 
-0.039** 
(-2.39) 
-0.092** 
(-2.39) 
-0.037** 
(-2.29) 
-0.087** 
(-2.28) 
-0.037** 
(-2.29) 
-0.087** 
(-2.29) 
MrktMet 
0.054*** 
(3.60) 
0.119*** 
(3.30) 
0.050*** 
(3.35) 
0.109*** 
(3.03) 
0.050*** 
(3.41) 
0.111*** 
(3.08) 
Size 
0.011* 
(1.68) 
0.027* 
(1.81) 
0.013* 
(1.86) 
0.033** 
(2.04) 
0.015** 
(2.14) 
0.038** 
(2.33) 
Leverage a 
-0.005 
(-0.68) 
-0.010 
(-0.54) 
-0.012 
(-1.54) 
-0.027 
(-1.46) 
-0.010 
(-1.33) 
-0.023 
(-1.26) 
Liquidity a 
0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.008 
(-0.24) 
0.003 
(0.25) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
-0.009 
(-0.29) 
ROA a 
-0.112 
(-0.61) 
-0.265 
(-0.61) 
-0.035 
(-0.20) 
-0.099 
(-0.24) 
-0.176 
(-0.98) 
-0.427 
(-1.00) 
StrategicOwn a 
-0.048 
(-0.51) 
-0.065 
(-0.31) 
-0.023 
(-0.25) 
-0.011 
(-0.05) 
-0.044 
(-0.47) 
-0.059 
(-0.28) 
Audit 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
-0.003 
(-0.57) 
0.009* 
(1.93) 
0.019* 
(1.70) 
0.012*** 
(2.65) 
0.026** 
(2.43) 
Enforcement 
0.002 
(1.05) 
0.006 
(1.45) 
-0.002 
(-0.85) 
-0.003 
(-0.71) 
-0.002 
(-1.09) 
-0.005 
(-0.95) 
AbsDisc 
-0.001 
(-0.10) 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
0.002 
(0.95) 
0.005 
(1.00) 
0.005** 
(2.06) 
0.011** 
(2.05) 
Industry f.e. Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year f.e. Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 581 581 581 581 581 581 
F 4.80*** 3.83*** 4.01*** 3.29*** 4.77*** 4.08*** 
R2-adj 0.080 0.066 0.082 0.069 0.098 0.084 
Mean VIF 1.76 1.76 2.18 2.18 2.25 2.25 
a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
See Appendix for variables’ definitions. 
 
 
